A frequent topic of discussion in after action reviews (AARs) of unit performance at JRTC, TSE operations were viewed as one of the most common and widespread of all problems identified by the Council since its inception in 2004. The identification of this need led to the present investigation, the purpose of which was twofold. First, the Council wanted to determine the overall prevalence of various small unit TSE practices at JRTC, in an attempt to pinpoint those areas of TSE operations in which units have the greatest difficulty. Second, the Council wanted to evaluate the effectiveness of a job performance aid, the TSE Smart Card (GTA 17-09-001). Specifically, they wanted to know if units given these tactical pocket guides at the beginning of their rotation would subsequently exhibit better TSE performance than units that were not given the guides.
Procedure:
The Warrior Leadership Council developed the TSE Checklist as a measurement tool for T/Ms to use in gauging the TSE performance of battalions, companies, and platoons during force-on-force missions and situational training exercises (STXs) at JRTC. The checklist measured 51 unit performance tasks in four TSE areas: unit background, planning, execution, and follow-up. The Council then compared the TSE performance of units that were given copies of the TSE Smart Card, the experimental group, to the TSE performance of earlier units that had not received the TSE Smart Card, the baseline group. Baseline data were drawn from 249 checklists collected by T/Ms during five consecutive unit rotations in 2008 and early 2009. Experimental data were drawn from 269 checklists collected during four later rotations in 2009.
Findings:
Over the span of nine rotations, most units performed relatively well in the areas of TSE execution (e.g., performing searches) and follow-up (e.g., avoiding deviation from mission v vi accomplishment). In fact, eight of the 10 strongest TSE tasks were found in these two areas. In contrast, units tended to have their greatest difficulty in the areas of background (e.g., having a site exploitation checklist) and planning (e.g., including a site survey in their TSE plan). Eight of the ten weakest TSE tasks were found in the latter two areas. The TSE Smart Card appeared to have a positive effect on the TSE operations of units receiving them, across all four areas of TSE performance. Units in the experimental group performed better than baseline units on 42 of the 51 TSE measures (82%). Statistically significant group differences were found on 27 of these measures (53%).
Utilization and Dissemination of Findings:
Findings were briefed to members of the JRTC Warrior Leadership Council in October of 2009. Based on the results obtained in the present investigation, both the authors and members of the Council recommend continued use of the TSE Smart Card for units training at JRTC, as well as for units conducting TSE training at their home station. The continued use of the TSE Checklist at JRTC is also recommended, so T/Ms can systematically gather supporting TSE data to use in their AARs. In particular, it is recommended that the checklist be included in the next printing of JRTC's T/M Handbook. A frequent topic of discussion in after action reviews (AARs) of unit performance at JRTC, TSE was the fourth problem area investigated by the Warrior Leadership Council since its inception in 2004. Earlier Council investigations dealt with troop leading procedures (Evans & Baus, 2006) , unit information management practices (Evans, Reese, & Weldon, 2007) , and casualty evacuation procedures (Evans, Coerper, & Johnson, 2009) . In its investigation of unit TSE practices, Council members believed TSE performance on the objective to be highly uneven across units. While some units had a good understanding of TSE operations and performed those operations effectively, others were generally unprepared to conduct TSE, as they had no plan for TSE operations, lacked any standing operating procedures (SOPs) to support TSE, and had no currently trained TSE teams.
To address these problems the Council began collecting data on unit TSE practices in November of 2008, using a T/M measurement instrument called the TSE Checklist (see Appendix A). Described in detail in the Research Approach section of this report, the checklist's design and content were based on the TSE doctrine contained in four U.S. Army field manuals (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2006; U.S. Department of the Army, 2002 Army, , 2006a Army, , 2006b .
One purpose of the present investigation was to determine the overall prevalence of various small unit TSE practices during force-on-force and situational training exercise (STX) missions at JRTC, in an attempt to pinpoint those areas of TSE operations in which units have the greatest difficulty. In particular, Council members wanted to determine the reasons why some units experience confusion in their execution of TSE operations and why some fail to identify and process important pieces of intelligence information on the battlefield.
A second purpose of the investigation was to evaluate, in a field environment, the effectiveness of a job performance aid that small unit leaders could use in the planning and conduct of TSE operations. Fortunately, a number of good TSE job aids have already been developed, including the Tactical The Council chose to evaluate the latter, as it had the most up-to-date content of the four job aids and was relatively simple in its design, which could facilitate local reproduction in the future. Specifically, the Council wanted to determine if units given the TSE Smart Card at the beginning of their rotations would subsequently exhibit better TSE performance than units that were not given the TSE Smart Card.
Job performance aids have a rich history of organizational application, especially in the military (see Schultz & Wagner, 1981; Swezey, 1987 ; U.S. Department of the Army, 1999). In fact, earlier JRTC investigations have found support for the efficacy of job aids that were developed to improve troop leading procedures, information management, and casualty evacuation (Evans & Baus, 2006; Evans, Coerper, & Johnson, 2009; Evans, Reese, & Weldon, 2007) .
Research Approach
The TSE Checklist was developed by JRTC's Warrior Leadership Council as a measurement tool for T/Ms to use in gauging the TSE performance of battalions, companies, and platoons during force-on-force and STX missions at JRTC. The Council then selected the TSE Smart Card (U.S. Army Armor Center, 2008) for evaluation as a job performance aid that could potentially help small unit leaders plan and execute TSE operations. In evaluating the effectiveness of the TSE Smart Card, the TSE performance of units that were given these guides, the experimental group, was compared to the TSE performance of units that had not received the guides, the baseline group. Five consecutive baseline rotations were followed by four subsequent experimental rotations. Although it would have been better to counterbalance or alternate the order of experimental and baseline unit rotations, the Council believed it would have been too difficult to execute a counterbalanced design flawlessly, given the highly decentralized nature of the data collection effort across JRTC Operations Group divisions.
Sample
Baseline TSE data were drawn from 249 TSE Checklists completed by T/Ms during five consecutive JRTC rotations. Experimental TSE data were then drawn from 269 TSE Checklists completed during four subsequent rotations. Over these nine rotations, 1.8% of the checklists were collected from battalions, 17.0% from companies, and 81.3% from platoons. Overall, 47.6% of the observed missions were force-on-force missions and 52.4% were STX missions. The baseline and experimental groups did not differ significantly in terms of the echelons and mission types observed.
However, the two groups were found to be significantly different in terms of the types of units observed [χ 2 (4, N = 475) = 9.60, p = .048]. These unit differences are shown in Table 1 . The most notable differences between groups were a higher percentage of Field Artillery units in the baseline group and a higher percentage of Infantry units in the experimental group. Although statistically significant, these differences were relatively small in terms of absolute percentages, the largest being the 8.2 percentage point difference between Infantry units in the two groups. In addition, the two groups differed significantly in terms of the types of TSE operations they conducted [χ 2 (1, N = 419) = 8.64, p = .003]. Planned TSE operations were more prevalent in the baseline group (69.5%) than in the experimental group (55.5%), compared with opportunity TSE operations. 100.0% Notes. RSTA = Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition. Types of units that comprised less than 5% of the total sample were grouped into a category called Other.
Tactical Site Exploitation Checklist
Unit TSE practices were measured by T/Ms using the TSE Checklist (see Appendix A). Printed on the front and back of a yellow card that was approximately 8½ in. tall and 5 in. wide (22 x 13.4 cm), the TSE Checklist was organized into five sections. Section I asked T/Ms for some general information, including the dates of observation, the type of unit observed, the unit's echelon, the type of mission conducted, and the type of TSE operation observed.
Section II dealt with the TSE background of unit personnel, focusing on their general knowledge and preparedness to conduct TSE operations. Specifically, the checklist asked if the unit knew and understood TSE operations, if they had currently trained TSE teams, and if they had an SOP for TSE operations. T/Ms were also asked to list any references used in the establishment of the SOP, to note whether or not it included sample forms for various TSE tasks (e.g., site surveys and spot reports), and to note if the TSE responsibilities of key leaders were identified. Lastly, Section II asked if the unit had a site exploitation checklist, if Soldiers knew how to perform TSE, and if unit TSE equipment was packed and readily available for use.
Section III dealt with TSE planning. In particular, the checklist asked about the thoroughness of TSE plans and whether or not TSE was included in the unit's overall mission planning process. T/Ms were asked if TSE plans were rehearsed, if the communications plan was rehearsed, if the unit developed and disseminated primary intelligence requirements (PIR), and if the unit coordinated with other units in their area of operations (AO). Additionally, T/Ms were asked whether or not pre-combat checks (PCCs) and pre-combat inspections (PCIs) of TSE kits were performed, and whether or not a debriefing plan existed. Finally, Section III asked T/Ms if unit personnel understood their mission plans, including differences between planned and opportunity TSE operations.
Section IV focused on the execution of TSE operations. Following questions about the observed combat situation, available TSE opportunities, and surrounding conditions, T/Ms were asked if units did a site survey and assessment, made a site recording, and followed their TSE SOP. They were also asked about whether interpreters and host nation forces were integrated, whether methodical searches were performed, and whether detainees were searched, tactically questioned, and enrolled in the Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment System (HIIDES). Other Section IV items asked about searching and securing vehicles, as well as collecting and processing evidence. Lastly, T/Ms were asked if TSE operations were executed in a timely manner and if the unit orchestrated TSE in accordance with the combat situation (i.e., Operation Enduring Freedom vs. Operation Iraqi Freedom).
Section V was devoted to follow-up operations. Specifically, T/Ms were asked if TSE teams were debriefed, if collected packets were reviewed for completeness, and if the collected information was processed and disseminated. They were also asked whether detainees were properly processed and whether data from the HIIDES was downloaded into the Biometric Automated Toolset System (BATS). Similar to questions found on previously developed JRTC checklists (Evans & Baus, 2006; Evans, Coerper, & Johnson, 2009; Evans, Reese, & Weldon, 2007) , T/Ms were then asked whether TSE operations interfered with mission accomplishment and whether friction points were observed between the unit and higher echelons. Lastly, T/Ms were asked to list TSE tasks the unit should sustain and those they should improve.
Most questions on the TSE Checklist called for a Yes or No response. The Warrior Leadership Council chose this response scale for two reasons. First, they thought a Yes/No format would be relatively easy to use, minimizing the data collection burden on T/Ms. Second, the Council believed this format would lower the amount of subjectivity contained in the checklist data, by simply asking T/Ms whether or not particular TSE practices occurred, rather than asking them to decide how good those practices were.
Largely in response to T/M feedback about checklist usability, the TSE Checklist was revised after the first baseline rotation. These revisions included some item deletions, item additions, and changes to item wording. The final version of TSE Checklist, shown in Appendix A, was used exclusively during the second baseline rotation and all subsequent rotations. The results reported herein were based solely on items contained in the final version of the checklist.
Tactical Site Exploitation Smart Card
The TSE Smart Card was developed by the Directorate of Training, Doctrine, Combat Development and Experimentation at the U.S. Army Armor Center (U.S. Army Armor Center, 2008). Designed as a tactical pocket reference, it was printed in color on both sides of one 18 x 11 in. sheet (45.7 x 27.9 cm 
Procedure
Through their JRTC Operations Group divisions, T/Ms were issued blank TSE Checklists prior to each baseline and experimental rotation. Completed checklists were then collected at several centralized locations after each rotation had ended. In most instances, an interim analysis of the findings for each rotation was completed and presented to members of the Warrior Leadership Council prior to the beginning of the next rotation.
TSE Smart Cards were obtained from the U.S. Army Armor Center and distributed to units in the four experimental rotations at the beginning of each rotation. Specifically, the TSE Smart Cards were provided by Warrior Leadership Council members to the battalion leadership and they were encouraged to distribute them down to platoon level. While most Council members believed they were thoroughly distributed down to company level, it was unclear how well the guides were distributed to platoons.
No attempt was made to keep T/Ms blind regarding the experimental condition in effect for each rotation (i.e., baseline vs. experimental). T/Ms on the Warrior Leadership Council should certainly have been aware of the experimental condition in effect, as they were responsible for TSE Smart Card distribution. However, other T/Ms may have been unaware of the experimental conditions, as their data collection role did not change in any way across baseline and experimental rotations. The TSE research plan developed by the Council and approved by the Deputy Commander and Command Sergeant Major of the JRTC Operations Group is shown in Appendix B.
It should be noted that the present investigation was conducted simultaneously with an ongoing Army and JRTC initiative to establish and train Company Intelligence Support Teams (CoISTs). Described more fully by Sanders (2009) , CoISTs are typically trained through a fiveday program conducted by a Mobile Training Team (MTT) approximately three months prior to their unit's scheduled rotation at JRTC. Because MTTs disseminate training materials, including TSE materials, during their training programs, it is possible baseline units had access to the TSE Smart Card and other TSE references prior to and during their JRTC rotations. Conversely, it is also entirely possible that some experimental units did not actually use the TSE Smart Cards provided to them during this investigation. Thus, real differences between the baseline and experimental groups in terms of job aid usage may have been less than intended. In an attempt to address this potential problem, an item was included on the TSE Checklist that asked T/Ms to list any TSE references they observed being used to develop unit TSE SOPs. This checklist item would enable the TSE performance of units that used TSE references (i.e., the aforementioned job aids and MTT training materials) to be compared with the TSE performance of those units that did not use TSE references, regardless of their experimental group assignments.
Results
The organization of this section closely parallels the general layout of the TSE Checklist (see Appendix A). Analyses of the results for individual items were based on the calculation of descriptive statistics (i.e., frequency distributions). Chi-square tests were also performed for each item, as well as when the relationship between two items was of interest (e.g., how rehearsals were related to the timeliness of TSE operations). Each analysis was based on the maximum sample size of checklists available for that analysis; thus, sample sizes varied somewhat across analyses due to missing checklist data.
Unit Background in Tactical Site Exploitation Operations
Section II of the TSE Checklist dealt with the TSE background of unit personnel, reflecting their potential degree of preparation for the successful conduct of TSE operations. Nine background tasks were measured nominally (yes vs. no). In general, these background tasks are best performed at a unit's home station, prior to arriving at JRTC. Ideally, one would want baseline and experimental group units to be roughly equivalent in terms of their background characteristics, in order to make any resulting group differences in TSE planning and execution more clearly interpretable. Unfortunately, this did not happen.
Results for the nine TSE background tasks are shown in Table 2 . Units in the experimental group performed better than baseline units on seven of the nine tasks, with statistically significant (p < .05) group differences found on six tasks. Experimental units were significantly more likely to have clearly understood TSE operations, to have currently trained TSE teams, to have used references in establishing their TSE SOP, to have personnel that knew how to perform TSE, and to have had their TSE equipment packed and readily available. Baseline units were significantly more likely to have leader responsibilities identified in their TSE SOP. Overall, these results suggested that experimental units were better prepared to conduct TSE operations than baseline units. One should keep this advantage in mind as the remaining results of the investigation are presented. 
Planning
Section III of the TSE Checklist sought to determine whether or not units performed a series of 18 planning tasks. Results are summarized in Table 3 . A higher percentage of experimental units completed 14 of the 18 tasks, with statistically significant (p < .05) group differences on eight tasks. Specifically, units in the experimental group were significantly more likely than baseline units to have included TSE in their mission plans, to have plans for both planned and opportunity TSE operations, to have plans for site security, to have a communications plan, to have TSE kits available, to have a plan for debriefing, and to have personnel who understood their TSE mission, as well as personnel who understood the difference between planned and opportunity TSE missions. Overall, these results suggested that units in the experimental group generally made better plans for TSE operations than units in the baseline group. 
Execution
Section IV of the TSE Checklist sought to determine whether or not units executed a series of 16 TSE tasks. Results are summarized in Table 4 . A higher percentage of experimental units completed 13 of the 16 tasks, with statistically significant (p < .05) group differences on eight tasks. In particular, units in the experimental group were significantly more likely than baseline units to have identified the situation for TSE operations, to have taken advantage of TSE opportunities, to have done a survey and assessment of the site, and to have made a recording of the site. Similarly, experimental units were significantly more likely to have followed their TSE SOP, to have the Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment System (HIIDES) available, to have executed TSE operations in a timely manner, and to have orchestrated TSE operations in accordance with the appropriate combat situation (i.e., Operation Enduring Freedom vs. Operation Iraqi Freedom). Overall, these results indicate that units in the experimental group generally executed their TSE operations better than units in the baseline group. 
Follow-up Operations
Section V of the TSE Checklist sought to determine whether or not units executed a series of eight TSE follow-up tasks. Results are summarized in Table 5 . A higher percentage of experimental units completed each of the eight tasks, with statistically significant (p < .05) group differences on six tasks. Specifically, units in the experimental group were significantly more likely than baseline units to have debriefed their TSE teams, to have reviewed collected packets for completeness, and to have properly processed and turned over their detainees and EPWs. Similarly, experimental units were significantly more likely to have a Company Intelligence Team, to have their collected information processed and disseminated, and to have pursued TSE operations without deviating from the accomplishment of their mission. 
Strengths and Weaknesses
A total of 51 nominal measures of TSE task performance were included in the present investigation. Of these, nine were related to a unit's TSE background, 18 were related to the planning of TSE operations, 16 were related to the execution of TSE operations, and eight were related to TSE follow-up. Across all baseline and experimental units observed, the 10 TSE tasks with the highest completion percentages are shown in Table 6 , while the 10 tasks with the lowest completion percentages are shown in Table 7 . 
Rehearsals and Mission Accomplishment
A unit's propensity to conduct rehearsals was found to have a strong positive relationship with mission accomplishment in previous JRTC research (Evans & Baus, 2006; Evans, Coerper, & Johnson, 2009; Evans, Reese, & Weldon, 2007) . In contrast to previous research, however, a unit's failure to conduct TSE operations on the objective might not have an immediate negative impact on mission accomplishment. For example, it is entirely possible that a failure to conduct comprehensive TSE might actually enhance short-term mission accomplishment, as units could spend less time on the objective prior to follow-on operations. In the present investigation, 82.6% of the all units conducting rehearsals pursued TSE operations without deviating from mission accomplishment, compared with 86.7% of units not conducting rehearsals. This difference was not statistically significant [χ 2 (1, N = 476) = 1.37, p = .242].
Although TSE rehearsals did not enhance mission accomplishment, they were found to have a number of other advantages. 
Plan Completeness
A measure of TSE plan completeness was created from the seven plan characteristics mentioned in Questions 2-4 of Section III on the TSE Checklist (see Appendix A). Ranging from zero to seven, plan completeness scores were computed by simply counting the number of characteristics found in each unit's TSE plan. Units with higher plan completeness scores were found to have a significantly greater likelihood of conducting TSE operations that were appropriate for the combat situation [χ 2 (7, N = 473) = 114.42, p = .0001]. For example, 100% of the units with a plan completeness score of 7 had TSE operations appropriate for the combat situation, compared with 33.1% of units having a plan completeness score of 0.
Plan completeness was also found to be significantly related to the timeliness of TSE operations [χ 2 (7, N = 485) = 86.77, p = .0001] and to the likelihood that a unit took advantage of its TSE opportunities [χ 2 (7, N = 489) = 105.80, p = .0001]. For example, 72.2% of the units with a plan completeness score of seven conducted timely TSE operations, compared with 20.6% of units having a plan completeness score of zero. Similarly, 75.0% of the units with a plan completeness score of seven took advantage of their TSE opportunities, compared with 22.8% of units having a plan completeness score of zero.
Job Aid Usage
As mentioned previously, units in the baseline group could have used TSE job aids they acquired on their own or from CoIST MTTs. Conversely, there was no guarantee that units in the experimental group would actually use the TSE Smart Cards provided to them during the present investigation. To address this methodological problem, the TSE performance of 111 baseline and experimental group units that were observed to have used a job aid like the TSE Smart Card, or any of the others mentioned in the Introduction (see page 2), was compared to the performance of 392 baseline and experimental group units that were not observed to have used any TSE job aids. In fact, 65.1% of the units using job aids had timely TSE operations, compared with 43.4% of those that did not. Similarly, 67.6% of units using job aids took advantage of their TSE opportunities, compared with 51.7% of those that did not. Further, 82.4% of units using job aids conducted TSE operations appropriate for the combat situation, compared with 62.3% of those that did not.
In addition, job aid usage was found to be significantly related to the completeness of a unit's TSE plans [χ 2 (7, N = 489) = 39.06, p = .0001]. For example, 76.1% of the units using job aids were found to have plan completeness scores of two or more, compared with 48.9% of units not using job aids.
Discussion
One purpose of the present investigation was to determine the overall prevalence of various unit TSE practices during JRTC training missions, in an attempt to pinpoint those areas in which units have the greatest difficulty. Based on the combined results from nine JRTC rotations, several areas of relative weakness were found (see Table 7 ). Six of the 10 weakest TSE tasks were related to TSE planning (e.g., including a site survey in the TSE plan). These results suggest the greatest improvement in unit TSE performance may come from concentrating training efforts in the area of TSE planning. Using the TSE Smart Card, or other TSE job aids, did help in this regard. Probably the one thing that units can do to better perform TSE operations at JRTC is to do a better job of planning and rehearsing their TSE operations. Units that rehearsed their TSE plans were significantly more likely to have had timely TSE operations, to have taken advantage of their TSE opportunities, and to have performed TSE operations that were appropriate for the combat situation. Areas of relative strength were also found (see Table  6 ). Eight of the 10 strongest TSE tasks were related to either TSE execution or follow-up (e.g., performing searches or avoiding deviations from mission accomplishment).
A second purpose of the investigation was to evaluate the effectiveness of the TSE Smart Card in the planning and conduct of TSE operations. Overall, units that were given these job aids at the beginning of their rotations were more likely than baseline units to have successfully completed 42 of the 51 TSE tasks measured (82%). Statistically significant group differences were found on 27 of these tasks (53%). These differences were found across all four types of TSE tasks: background, planning, execution, and follow-up.
Because all unit rotations in the experimental group occurred after those in the baseline group, it is possible the relatively higher TSE performance of experimental units was caused by some factor(s) unrelated to TSE Smart Card usage. For instance, the increasing emphasis on intelligence collection and dissemination at the company level by JRTC and the Army over the course of the present investigation may have benefited later units more than earlier ones. This factor undoubtedly influenced the results to some extent, as units in the experimental group were found to have personnel with generally stronger TSE backgrounds. Experimental units were also more likely to have company intelligence teams and to have supporting TSE equipment like HIIDES and BATS.
To address this methodological shortcoming, the TSE performance of units using TSE job aids was compared to that of units not using job aids. Regardless of whether they were in the baseline or experimental group, units using TSE job aids tended to have much better TSE performance than units not using job aids. In fact, higher levels of statistical significance were found in the job aid usage comparisons than were found in the experimental-baseline comparisons. These results suggested that job aids like the TSE Smart Card can help to improve the TSE performance of all units, whether they have strong or weak backgrounds in TSE operations.
Job aid usage was generally low across both experimental and baseline units. Among units having an SOP for TSE operations, only 18.3% of baseline units and 25.6% of experimental units were observed to have used either the TSE Smart Card or other similar job aids, though this usage difference was found to be statistically significant (see Table 2 ). There are several possible reasons why job aid usage was not higher among experimental units. First, unit personnel may have simply chosen not the use them. Second, T/Ms may not have been able to see them being used. Third, the job aids that were provided to unit leaders may not have been distributed down to platoon and squad levels, suggesting the way training materials are distributed to units may need to be improved in future JRTC research projects.
Based on the overall results obtained in the present investigation, both the authors and members of the Council recommend continued use of the TSE Smart Card for units training at JRTC, as well as for units conducting TSE training at their home station. The continued use of the TSE Checklist at JRTC is also recommended, so T/Ms can systematically gather supporting TSE data to use in their AARs. In particular, it is recommended that the checklist be included in the next printing of JRTC's T/M Handbook. 
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